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BY T H E end of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man Stephen has more or less 'kil led off everybody else, and finds himself in sole possession of his universe. A t this point he 
shows clear symptoms of linguistic deracination, a consequence 
towards which he had been heading steadily since birth; and he 
has come to this pass owing to a characteristic mode of perception 
on his part, one closely associated with the theories of perception 
advanced by the Anglo-Irish philosopher and famous Trinity 
College man, Bishop Berkeley. As Adaline Glasheen's A Second 
Census of Finnegan's Wake (1963) demonstrates, there are ample 
enough references to Berkeley in Finnegan's Wake to justify our 
resort to him for help in understanding aspects of Joyce's work. 
A n d Joyce's workbook for this novel, which he called Scribblede-
hobble, gives warrant for referring to his final work at some length 
to illustrate the problem posed here. N o w handsomely edited, the 
S cribbledebobbie amply documents the continuity of Joyce's work ; 
indeed that continuity is even more thoroughgoing than is 
generally recognized. As Thomas E . Connolly says, in his edition 
of James Joyce's S cribbledebobbie (1961), its construction shows that 
Joyce conceived Fitinegaii's Wake as 'an extension not only of 
Ulysses, but of all his previous works'. 
I 
A n examination of a passage of Finnegan's Wake w i l l supply an 
explanation of the theory of perception with which Joyce was 
concerned : 
Bymeby, bullocky vampas tappany bobs topside joss pidgin fella 
Balkelly, archdruid of islish chinchinjoss in the his heptachromatic 
sevenhued septicoloured roranyellgreenlindigan mantle finish he show 
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along the his mister guest Patholic . . . speeching yeh not speeching noh 
man liberty is, he drink up words, scilicet, tomorrow till recover will 
not, all too many much illusiones through photoprismic velamina of 
hueful panepiphanal world spectacurum of Lord Joss, the of which 
zoantholitic furniture, from mineral through vegetal to animal, not 
appear to full up together fallen man than under but one photoreflec-
tion of the several iridals gradationes of solar light, that one which that 
part of it (furnit of heupanepi world) had shown itself (part of fur of 
huepanwor) unable to absorbere, whereas for numpa one puraduxed 
seer in seventh degree of wisdom of Entis-Onton he savvy inside true 
inwardness of reality, the Ding hvad in idself id est, all objects (of 
panepiwor) allside showed themselves in trues coloribus resplendent 
with sextuple gloria of light actually retained, untisintus, inside them 
(obs of epiwo). (p. 611, 11. 4-7, 10-24) 
A t least one critic, Professor Wil l iam Y o r k Tindall , has 
declared in his Reader's Guide to Finnegan's Wake (1969), that this 
passage is 'as obscure as anything in the Wake', and avoided any 
useful reference to Berkeley himself. We need to attend more 
closely to the extract for two reasons. Firstly Joyce himself 
emphasized its importance, albeit in typically cryptic terms. He 
told Frank Budgen, in a letter of 20 August 1939, that 
Much more is intended in the colloquy between Berkeley the arch 
druid and his pidgin English and Patrick the [?] and his Nippon 
English. It is also the defence and indictment of the book itself, 
Berkeley's theory of colours and Patrick's practical solution of the 
problem. Hence the phrase in the preceding Mutt and Jeff banter 'Dies 
is Dorminus master' Deus est Dominus noster plus the day is Lord 
over sleep, i.e. when it days. (Fetters of James Joyce, ed. S. Gilbert, 
1957, p. 406) 
Secondly, it was among the earliest passages drafted for Finnegan's 
Wake, having been written during July and August 1923, 
although it was placed eventually almost at the very end — 
possibly, either to cover up traces, or because of its climactic 
importance. Joyce's use of crucial ideas of Berkeley enables us to 
see Stephen, the artist, preparing to rival scientific discoverers. 
Stephen's flight is not 'escape', as it is commonly taken to be, but 
a soaring adventure in which, flying to the sun like his namesake, 
he is defeated and becomes vaporized only by the stupendousness 
of his goal. 
James S. Atherton quotes one of the earliest drafts of the above 
passage in his The Books at the Wake (1962). While he is not quite 
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accurate in asserting (p. 98) that this version bears 'little resem-
blance' to Berkeley's theory of perception, he seems to be the 
only scholar who recognizes that 'Bishop Berkeley's work is of 
considerable importance inVinnegan's Wake'. There are, in fact, two 
other manuscript versions in Joyce's hand, and at least one further 
typescript version (made by Miss Harriet Shaw Weaver) which 
need to be taken into account. 1 For example, by referring to all 
four versions we see that the word 'roranyellgreenlindigan' was 
at an earlier stage 'roranyellgreeblindigo' which compresses all 
the colours of the spectrum except violet into one word. 
Having consulted all four draft versions carefully I would like 
to offer the following tentative paraphrase in order to illustrate 
how much closer the passage is to the implications of Berkeley's 
philosophy than is believed (the explanatory matter within 
brackets may be ignored in a ñist reading): 
By and by the superficially Christian ['topside joss'] pidgin fellow 
Berkeley, Archbishop of the Anglo-Irish Church in Jesus, who 
presented as new a patchwork theory made of old materials as if it 
were a Papal Bull ['buííocky vampas'j, in his sevencoloured red-orange-
yellow-green-blue-indigo mantle finish [i.e. in the terms of his theory 
of perception via sense-data] explained to Patrick . . . that since no 
man is free [also : Noman] he swallows up words, to wit ['scilicet'], the 
innumerable illusions caused by the rainbow-coloured veneer {velamen: 
outer covering or membrane of the aerial roots of orchids] of the 
panepiphanal universal spectrum of Lord Jesus. The whole of this 
spectrum wil l not be perceived until the after life ['tomorrow']. The 
primal furniture of earth \gpanthus: name of genus whose elemental 
constituents are arranged in sixes], mineral, vegetable, and animal, do 
not offer a full picture of fallen man. One part of the eternal photo-
reflection of the several rainbow ['iridai'] gradations of solar light 
cannot be perceived in this life. Only an outstanding puraduxed 
[paradoxical?] seer possessing wisdom of the Einsteinian-Newtonian 
kind to the seventh degree will sense inwardly [Joyce used the phrase 
'beholding interiorly' in B M Add. MS. 47488, f. 100, before he deleted 
it] the true reality, its quidditas, the thing which in itself it is ; only to 
such a one would all objects show themselves unstintingly resplendent 
in the sixfold panoply of light, obscured from the epiphanal world. 
[In this paraphrase N E D (1928) meanings for the following words 
1 T h e s e are B r i t i s h M u s e u m A d d M S . 47488, f. 99 , 100 , 10 1 (these three i n J o y c e ' s 
h a n d ) , 102-3 (the u n r c v i s e d typescr ip t m a d e b y M i s s W e a v e r ) . T h e v e r s i o n i n f. 99 
is r e p r o d u c e d i n A First Draft Version ofFinnegan's Wake, ed . D a v i d H a y m a n , 1963. 
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have been drawn upon : bullock, bullocky, vamp, scilicet, velamen, %oanthus, 
iridai.] 
Every reader of Fiunegau's Wake knows better than to claim 
that even the most concentrated exegesis wi l l ever wholly resolve 
the abiding ambiguity of Joyce's syntax, let alone his ever-shifting 
allusions, and wTorse, his 'point of view'. Still the general drift 
is clear. Only an outstanding seer wi l l perceive the reality not 
exhausted by the external world of sense-data, in the same way that 
an outstanding thinker like Einstein developed his Theory of 
Relativity from the pioneering work of Newton about the nature 
and colours of light. Since Newton's day (and Berkeley was a 
younger contemporary of his) the rainbow has been conven-
tionally regarded as having seven principal colours, red, orange, 
yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet. Newton invested the 
seventh colour with mysterious qualities, and early twentieth-
century investigations of light which revealed a host of 'colours' 
not visible to the naked eye like ultra-violet, infra-red, gamma 
rays and so on, have justified his instinctive reservations about a 
closed definition of light. Einstein's analysis of the nature of light 
was in a way metaphorical, but it 'worked'. It led him to formu-
late his Special, General, and Unified Theories of Relativity, 
which gave an unprecedented picture of the nature of the uni-
verse. (The non-scientist wi l l find that L incoln Barnett in The 
Universe and Dr Einstein, gives a useful introduction to these 
formulations.) These historic formulations, the first in 1905, were 
given to the world within Joyce's lifetime, and it is as i f Joyce 
wished to discover a literary realm of parallel, or even surpassing 
magnitude. By analogy, Joyce through Berkeley is saying, one 
with exceptional powers of inward perception can also see into 
the heart of life. Joyce plays rather deftly with the numbers six and 
seven. Having said 'sevencoloured' he advances a compounded 
word which gives only six colours tailing off with '-an' (and) to 
suggest the mystery of the seventh. Similarly he employs alterna-
tive words like 'prism', 'spectrum', and ' iridai ' to keep the image 
of the seven-coloured rainbow dominant while implying that the 
picture is incomplete. He alludes to a genus whose constituents 
are arranged in sixes ('zoantholitic' from ^oanthus) implying that 
we do not perceive a seventh unknown part of the material 
universe. His seer must have not the sixth but the seventh degree 
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of wisdom, too, to be able to grasp the mystery of the rainbow's 
'mysterious' seventh colour, hence light's unknown dimensions. 
A n d yet the seer of the qmdditas of reality beholds objects in a 
'sextuple gloria of light'. The seer is not a scientist: he beholds 
'interiorlv' even as Berkeley did, which leads one to think that the 
seer's perception is wider than, subsumes within it even, the 
Einsteinian-Newtonian k i n d ; and light here is not the light of 
physics alone but of understanding — obtained, one guesses, 
through the five senses plus the mysterious sixth sense transcend-
ing these. The sixth sense is not exclusively a divine prerogative 
but reputedly available to some human beings. Joyce may have 
thus meant to insinuate that his seer might be able to emulate 
G o d in grasping the total picture. 
We may truly say that Berkeley's central philosophy is at sixes 
and sevens in this passage: Joyce very probably meant it to 
be so. In Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Know-
ledge occurs his most famous dictum 'Esse is percipi' — to be is 
to be perceived. In the theory of perception there described, the 
word colour necessarily implies something seen, sound something 
heard, shape something seen or touched, and therefore according 
to this view, it is illogical to think of objects as existing prior to, 
or independent of the mind (Berkeley, A New Theory of Vision and 
Other Writings, 1969, p. 113). A n d in the Dialogues between Hylas and 
Philonous Berkeley declared that to posit a reality beyond what 
was so apprehended is to contend for 'an unknown somewhat 
(if indeed it may be termed somewhat) which is quite stripped of all 
sensible qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense nor 
apprehended by the mind' (Berkeley, A New Theory of Vision, 
Everyman Library edition, p. 300). 
Berkeley was much assailed in his own day by critics who under-
stood h im to say that he denied the existence of the material 
world except as sense-data received by the mind, and later 
readers have laboured under similar misconceptions. Berkeley 
was very sensibly seeking to limit the realm of discourse to what 
could be discoursed about: in brief, there is a theory of language 
implied in his philosophy. He repeatedly pleaded for common-
sense, urging the observer to 'sound your own thoughts'. 'Be 
not deceived by words,' Philonous advises Hylas in their T h i r d 
Dialogue, or one would be led to definitions 'entirely made up of 
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negatives'. In other words, language should be restricted to 
describing a completely perceivable reality, and has no role 
beyond this. 
There is too fine a difference between this interpretation by 
Berkeley of external reality and outright solipsism, for us not to 
confound the two fairly frequently. Actually, later phenomena-
lists extended the theory of perception opened up by Berkeley, 
adding hypothetical propositions to categorical ones. They 
talked not only of actual sensations but of possible ones if an 
observer were present, hoping thereby to provide a more exhaus-
tive description of reality. In either version our knowledge of 
each object is a bundle of sensations or ideas about it, gathered 
piecemeal through experience or compounded by the mind in its 
own ways. 
Berkeley's empiricist successors went on to the bitter logical end, 
excluding metaphysical discussions altogether, but that was not 
his own way. He reconciled his religion with his theory (shades of 
Joyce's 'patchwork') by declaring it self-evident that the reality 
unperceived by human observers was perceived by a cosmic 
mind anyhow, and therefore, though not known to them, existed: 
Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind, that a man 
need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to 
be, to wit, that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth [cf. 
Joyce's 'furnit of huepanepi world'], in a word all those bodies which 
compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence 
without a mind, that their being (esse) is to be perceived or known ; that 
consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do 
not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must have 
no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some external spirit. (A 
New Theory of Vision, pp. 115-16, author's italics) 
Expressed in this way the theory has a certain undeniable con-
sistency, but of course it is not a wholly defensible account, as 
later philosophers were to show. The question needs deeper 
examination, not only in respect of Berkeley but of Locke, 
Hume, and Kant as well, i f only because the modern rationalist 
tradition which originated with these thinkers and has been 
distinguished by a series of fiats l imiting the scope and quality of 
linguistic expressiveness, clearly engaged Joyce's attention. 
But what is asserted in the passage from Finnegan's Wake is that, 
Berkeley notwithstanding, a seer may obtain the full picture of 
6» 
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reality in this life, and not wait for the after life to do so. Typically, 
Joyce both uses Berkeieian ideas of perception even as he rejects 
their human limitations. The underlying image is of a camera film 
absorbing impressions. 'Beleave filmly', is how Juva conveys the 
essentials of Berkeley's thought to Muta (Finnegan's Wake, p. 610, 
1. 5) ; Berkeley himself said that ideas are 'imprinted' on the senses. 
Crucial impressions are missing because human beings cannot 
absorb the total picture ('one photoreflection') seen by G o d . 
N o w standing Berkeley on his head, that is another way of saying 
that we haven't yet got the words for it. I f we have the word for a 
thing it exists. We have the words for the corporeal reality around 
us because we have sense-data about it. We perceive, therefore it is. 
In this sense it is true to say that in absorbing sense-data we are, 
like Berkeley's Nomati , 'drinking up words', taking the impres-
sions of the epiphanal world into our consciousness. Language 
and reality do not simply mirror each other in one-to-one corres-
pondence, they are, uncannily, almost one. 
It follows equally that the cosmic mind has its store of words 
for the total ana eternal reality (corporeal and metaphysical) 
which it alone perceives — the one photoreflection of all the 
gradations of solar light. Since this perception is also accessible 
to an outstanding seer, such a one has therefore a vocabulary 
augmented beyond the human. O r rather, in much the same 
manner as ideas, following Berkeley, are compounded with 
others or subdivided in différent ways to contribute to fidier 
perception (Berkeley, A New Theory of Vision, p. 113), so the 
seer has the instinctive capacity to make endlessly new units or 
compounds from the existing human store o f words — not only 
from the English language but from all languages — to represent 
the total reality. In Book 11 section i i of Finnegan's Wake, for 
example, Shem-'barekely' teaches Shaun about the world and its 
laws of time and space by 'chanching letters for them vice o'verse 
to bronze mottes and blending tschemes for em in trepadores 
and doublecressing twofold thruths and devising tingling tail-
words too' (p. 288, 11. 1-3). A rudimentary instance of the out-
come of this process is the series 'hueful panepiphanal world ' , 
'heupanepi world ' , 'huepanwor', panepiwor', 'epiwo'. 
The materials on which Joyce drew were truly prodigious. 
In the field of language alone, M . J . C. Hodgart, who referred 
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to B M A d d . M S . 47488, f. 180, found that Joyce compiled a 
list of forty languages which were used in Fitmegan's Wake. The 
list includes the main artificial languages which held out tem-
porary hope, at the turn of the century, for a single medium of 
international communication, Volapuk, Esperanto, and Nov ia l 
('Artificial Languages', A Wake Digest, ed. Clive Hart and Fritz 
Senn, 1968, pp. 5 6-8). It is possible momentarily to entertain the 
idea that by conflating all the languages of the world we might 
arrive at a unified picture of reality — to rival Einstein's Unified 
Theory of Relativity. But in that case language becomes deraci-
nated, metamorphosing into a kind of pidgin : hence 'pidgin fella 
Balkelly'. While the mighty linguistic experiment of Finnegan's 
Wake may be, in passing, a commentary on the movement for a 
single universal language, in Joyce's coinage the artist-seer who 
would use it seeks not merely international communication but 
to lay bare the secrets of the heavens. More than we ever suspected, 
he would indeed be like G o d . T tried to love G o d , ' Stephen 
Dedalus, the artist, says. Tt seems now I failed. It is very difficult. 
I tried to unite my wi l l with the wi l l of G o d instant by instant. 
In that I did not always fail. I could perhaps do that s t i l l . . .' 
(A Portrait of the Artist, 1952, p. 274). Strictly speaking, Stephen 
is Lucifer. His sin is pride. 
II 
It is not less than the very nature of language in reality into 
whose astral heights Stephen Dedalus flies. A t the very least, a 
mind-boggling fate. For much of A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man Stephen is a phenomenalist in the Berkeleian manner. 
M u c h of his growth consists of his progress in attempting to 
formulate the 'right' word or phrase, and in rejecting the 'wrong' 
one in the light of the sense-data he receives or the compounds of 
them which he unceasingly makes. T o put it in another way, only 
when he has found the right word for something is he satisfied 
that he has comprehended the part of reality it implies. It is 
difficult to say whether he acts solely on Berkeley's dictum 'To 
be is to be perceived' (crudely, ' If it exists, there is a word for it') 
or, equally frequently, on its obverse ' T o be perceived is to be' 
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(again crudely, 'If we have a word for it, it exists') — probably a 
confusing combination of the two . 1 
Resolving the problem of the relation between language and 
reality in this way is a programme involving strenuous discipline, 
and it is not surprising that his mind gives up this 'rigour' from 
time to time to freewheel, as it were, between 'the word and the 
vision' (A Portrait of the Artist, p. 102), when his best efforts 
of perception leave him deeply dissatisfied. His struggle is a 
recurrent dialectic between the two, word and vision, as i f he 
were trying desperately to make them coincide, trying to heal 
the fracture between language and reality, which Berkeley 
succeeded in doing only by invoking G o d . What complicates 
Stephen's efforts is that the vision is only guessed at; it is not a 
completely known thing for he has not yet found the language in 
which to express it. This, he gradually comes to apprehend, 
must be the artist's central concern. The drama of A Portrait of 
the Artist deals with the early stages of this quest: with the artist's 
efforts to escape the twin hazards of solipsism and materialism at 
every turn, and the pain of knowing that while the quest is 
absolutely necessary, full success must result in his fading out of 
existence 'like a film in the sun' (p. 105). 
The young boy's instinctive faculty for seeking precise lingu-
istic aptness between word and thing is assailed early by a 
premonition of the outer reaches of his quest. Having located 
himself in Clongowes W o o d College, Sallins, County Kildare, 
Ireland, The W o r l d , The Universe, he realizes that it is 'very big 
to think about everything and everywhere' (p. 17); and in his 
first attempt to contemplate 'what a big thought must be' he 
thinks of G o d in a passage which remarkably forecasts what wi l l 
be the obsessive interests of his later life: 
God was God's name just as his name was Stephen. Dieu was the French 
for God and that was God's name too ; and when any one prayed to 
God and said Dieu then God knew at once that it was a French person 
that was praying. But though there were different names for God in all 
the different languages in the world and God understood what all the 
1 F o r a n i n t r o d u c t i o n t o m o d e r n theor ies o f m e a n i n g a n d p e r c e p t i o n sec The 
Philosophy of Perception, ed . G . J . W a r n o c k ( O x f o r d , 1967) a n d The Theory of Meaning, 
ed. S. Ff. R . P a r k i n s o n ( O x f o r d , 1968). 
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people who prayed said in their different languages, still God remained 
always the same God and God's real name was God. 
It made him very tired to think that way. (pp. 17-18) 
Thenceforth his perceptions are governed by a brooding under-
current of doubt concerning his very medium, language, as 
much as the 'facts', the sense-data. 
Four of the principal protagonists in the quarrel over Parnell 
during the Christmas dinner on Stephen's return from school 
curiously 'clinch' their arguments with comments on the kind of 
language used. Mrs Riordan, quoting from the Scriptures about 
'the man by whom scandal cometh', concludes righteously, 
'That is the language of the Holy Ghost' , to which M r Dedalus 
coolly replies, ' A n d very bad language i f you ask me' (p. 36). 
M r Casey refers to 'the language with which the priests and the 
priests' pawns broke ParnelPs heart and hounded him into his 
grave', while Dante can only exclaim with bitter scorn, 'The 
blackest Protestant in the land would not speak the language I 
have heard this evening' (pp. 38-9). Stephen's reaction, ironically 
enough, is to go away and work out an equivalence between 
Eileen's long white hands and golden hair on the one hand, and 
'Tower of Ivory', 'House of G o l d ' on the other. 'By thinking 
of things you could understand them' (p. 48). Apparently as a 
direct consequence of the family altercation, sample religious 
epithets are tested for their revelatory power, and are found 
simply to represent tangible sensations. The boy's progress is 
metalinguistic to a greater degree than an ordinary child's. 
'Words he did not understand he said over and over to himself 
and through them he had glimpses of the real world about h im' 
(p. 70). 
But Stephen is not satisfied with the world so revealed. He 
has become convinced that its corporeal nature, revealed to the 
Berkeleian senses of sight, touch and smell, is at best an incom-
plete picture of reality, its language debased by the uses to which 
it is put by his elders. Berkeley's God's perception of the total 
picture is what he has become aware of, however inarticulately: 
He wanted to meet in the real world the unsubstantial image which his 
soul so constantly beheld. He did not know where to seek it or how, 
but a premonition which led him on told him that this image would, 
without any overt act of his, encounter him. They would meet quietly 
as if they had known each other and had made their tryst, perhaps at 
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one of the gates or in some more secret place. They would be alone, 
surrounded by darkness and silence: and in that moment of supreme 
tenderness he would be transfigured. He would fade into something 
impalpable under her eyes and then in a moment he would be trans-
figured, (p. 73) 
A t that imagined point of conjunction, language itself would 
fade — or apotheosize in the true reality. His real battle to escape 
the 'nets' of ordinary language now begins, as he matches its 
capacity to help to maintain sanity in a workaday world against the 
looming prospect of its severe inadequacy for anything beyond 
that. H e has already begun to distrust 'the constant voices of his 
father and of his masters . . . happy only when he was far away 
from them, beyond their call, alone or in the company of phan-
tasmal comrades' (pp. 94-5)-
His adolescent sexual desires temporarily deflect him from his 
purpose, but it is noteworthy that in his agony and its resolution, 
words arise provocatively, and are enlisted or discarded with 
dramatic force. Initially it is the word 'Foetus' which crystallizes 
his restlessness. 'The sudden legend startled his blood. ' The battle 
between 'the word and the vision' (i.e. the vision of former 
students — therefore, in an incipient way, of the 'nightmare of 
history'), set out on pages 101 and 102, shows the dramatic 
interlocking of external and internal worlds, before 'his mon-
strous reveries' become predominant. 'They too had sprung up 
before him, suddenly and furiously, out of mere words'. He 
relies in true phenomenalist fashion upon sense-data to give him a 
hold upon external reality: 
— I am Stephen Dedalus. I am walking beside my father whose name 
is Simon Dedalus. We are in Cork, in Ireland. Cork is a city. Our 
room is in the Victoria Hotel. Victoria and Stephen and Simon. 
Simon and Stephen and Victoria. Names, (p. 105) 
N o w this may be therapeutic in terms of his sexual confusion, 
but the inadequacy of this piecemeal series of categorical proposi-
tions may be seen by what follows : 'The memory of his child-
hood suddenly grew dim. He tried to recall forth some of its 
v iv id moments but could not. He recalled only names. Dante, 
Parnell, Clane, Clongowes.' The naive reliance upon material 
sense-data alone reveals no composing principle. In this extremity, 
with a kind of Aristotelian inevitability, Stephen temporarily 
surrenders his inarticulate desire to fashion a truer language, and 
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gratefully submits to the conventional hell-fire-and-damnation 
language of the sermon. Yet perversely, it is the keynote of 
that sermon, Lucifer's slogan, non servìam (p. 133) which he later 
adopts as the motto of his quest. A n d in the director's office, that 
quest for a truer language to represent reality reasserts itself. 
He feels 'a regret and a pity as though he wTere passing out of an 
accustomed world and were hearing its language for the last 
time' (p. 178). 
Soon afterwards, he draws forth 'a phrase from his treasure' — 
'a day of dappled seaborne clouds' — not particularly effective, 
perhaps, but in context it somehow comprehends both 'the faint 
sour stink of rotted vegetables' which he gets as he walks up the 
lane leading to his house (p. 185), and the frequently quoted 
vision of the girl on the beach (p. 195): 
— A day of dappled seaborne clouds. 
The phrase and the day and the scene harmonized in a chord. Words. 
Was it their colours? He allowed them to glow and fade, hue after 
hue: sunrise gold, the russet and green of apple orchards, azure of 
waves, the greyfringed fleece of clouds. No, it was not their colours : 
it was the poise and balance of the period itself. Did he then love the 
rhythmic rise and fall of words better than their associations of legend 
and colour? Or was it that, being as weak of sight as he was shy of 
mind, he drew less pleasure from the reflection of the glowing sensible 
world through the prism of a language manycoloured and richly 
storied than from the contemplation of an inner world of individual 
emotions mirrored perfectly in a lucid supple periodic prose? (pp. 
189-90) 
This is certainly a richer response, in a young man's slightly 
florid prose, than a straightforward phenomenalist's, looking 
forward to 'pidgin fella' Berkeley's 'heptachromatic, seven-
hued septicoloured' universe. Yet embedded in it are the three 
major alternatives facing any would-be writer. In the first 
instance, Stephen is teased by the thought that language and 
reality appear to be so nearly one, that to pursue language for its 
own sake could be deeply satisfying; presumably all reality would 
necessarily be implied by it. Second, he ponders whether language, 
'richly storied', shall deal with the sensible world. A n d thirdly, 
whether language shall deal solely with himself, the artist. One 
sees how Joyce the author produced works in response to each 
alternative in turn : Finnegan's Wake, Ulysses, and A. Portrait itself, 
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respectively. The major challenges for any artist are here in 
outline, however blurred the alternatives are, and however much 
they merge into each other, as of course they do. 
For Stephen, the vision has come tantalizingly closer. The 
clouds, he observes, had come out from Europe which : 
lay out there beyond the Irish Sea, Europe of strange tongues and 
valleyed and woodbegirt and citadelled and of entrenched and mar-
shalled races. He heard a confused music within him as of memories 
and names which he was almost conscious of but could not capture 
even for an instant; then the music seemed to recede, to recede, to 
recede . . . (p. 191) 
The first real symptoms of linguistic deracination begin here, i f 
anywhere, in his career as an artist, an inevitable process in view 
of the metaphysical scope of his programme. He has wrestled 
with the languages of politics and of religion and rejected them as 
too puny and limiting for his purposes : in introspection he finds 
himself walking ' in a lane among heaps of dead language' (p. 203). 
N o w he dreams of fashioning a more comprehensive, all-
embracing one — the second sentence in the above passage is 
the moment of conception of Finnegan's Wake, heralding its 
deracinated language — or linguistic innovation, i f you prefer it. 
Little details in Stephen's career at this moment underline 
his keener ear for inventiveness in language which could indicate 
ways of representing reality more aptly. His brothers and sisters 
who have been phantasmal figures in his consciousness, glow 
briefly when one of them, in answer to his question where his 
father and mother were, answers in the kind of artificial language 
children are fond of concocting: 'Goneboro toboro lookboro 
atboro aboro houseboro' (p. 186). The word ' ivy' is subjected 
to a kind of declension: 'Ivory, ivoire, avorio, ebur' (p. 203) remind-
ing him of the Latin sentence 'India mittit ebur'. He has moved 
from English to French to Italian to Latin, and thence leaped to 
India. His own name melts and half merges with its classical 
associations: 'Stephanos Dédalos! Stephanomenos ! Bous 
Stephanoforos!' 1 Strange indeed, he finds, is the power of 
language resourcefully exploited. 
1 F o r a c o m m e n t a r y o n th is p l a y w i t h his n a m e see E r n e s t B e r n h a r d t - K a b i s c h , 
' J o y c e ' s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Áíarí, The Explicator, x v i i i , J a n u a r y i 9 6 0 . 
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But this impetus receives a check which contradictorily marks 
a further stage in his quest: the very language he is using is 
someone else's. His conversation with the dean, with its cour-
teously veiled hostility, concerning whether a funnel is a funnel 
or a tundish (pp. 214-15) — 'It's called a tundish in Lower 
Drumcondra' , Stephen insists — makes him realize that the 
English language itself is but one more language game: 
The language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How 
different are the words borne, Christ, ale, master, on his lips and on mine! 
I cannot speak or write these words without unrest of spirit. His 
language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired 
speech. I have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them 
at bay. My soul frets in the shadow of his language, (p. 215) 
Thus is the Irish nationalist political argument masterfully sub-
sumed by the philosophical question whether the English 
language — ór any language — is the right medium for his 
disquisitions. This occurs at the beginning of the exposition of 
his much discussed aesthetic theory — another language game — 
and mines it at the very base. 1 
We find the dilemma which he deliberately embraces summed 
up unobtrusively in a brief exchange between himself and Dav in : 
T shall express myself as I am' to which Dav in replies, 'Try to be 
one of us' (p. 230, present author's italics). The essence of 
Stephen's approach to his art also points to the crucial fallacy, 
the logical absurdity towards which he is heading with such 
extraordinary rigour. What language itself — what racial or 
national language, i f you want to put it that way — shall he use ? 
None of them, it appears, has any particular claim to complete 
aptitude. It is not surprising at all that before leaving Ireland 
the only thing he finds himself 'armed' with besides exile and 
cunning is —silence (p. 281). Then in one of his diary entries at 
the end, he records that an argument of his — about Bruno — 
with one of his fellows 'began in Italian and ended in pidgin 
Engl ish ' (p. 283). The process of deracination is complete. 
I l l 
In A Portrait of the Artist the young man questions the very 
basis of his art, and proposes instead to make that basis eternal, 
no less — even i f it means that he wi l l be considered a casualty by 
1 See S. L . G o l d b e r g , The Classical Temper, 1961, p p . 4 1 -65 . 
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conventional devotees. N o t for nothing did Joyce originally 
plan to give the name of Stephen Hero to his protagonist. There 
is something foolhardy about Stephen's aim even as there is 
something truly heroic as well. It is difficult to agree that it is 
the 'lifeless formality' of Yeats's Byzantium which Stephen 
mistakenly pursues, i f only because that would put Joyce's 
own originality in question. 1 In fact, Joyce added a further turn 
of the screw in examining the foundations of literary creation, 
taking literature itself beyond itself into metalinguistic domains. 
Stephen's artistic fallacy is one intimately connected with the 
nature of language itself, and the relation of language to reality. 
The questions he asks are the questions every artist must ask (and 
every critic, too) i f only in order that we may come back chastened 
by the realization of how utterly insignificant literary creation, as 
we conventionally use the term, can be seen to be. 
What is so absolutely amazing is that like Shaw, who produced 
a Revolutionist's Handbook for John Tanner in Man and Super-
man, Joyce too showed, in Finnegan's Wake, how seriously and 
how far Stephen's quest could be taken, for what rewards, and at 
what cost. Joyce saw deeply into the artistic fallacy of believing 
that language — any one of our human languages today — is 
capable of giving the compietesi account of reality. Equally he 
perceived the fallacy of hopes that an artificial language 
deliberately invented would be equal to the task. There is no 
doubt that he was also profoundly attracted to the artistic 
representation of this problem for the lessons it could embody for 
literature, as much as for the entertainment it could provide. 
Indeed, he made the exploration of it his life's work. It is known 
that after Finnegan's Wake he was planning a book about the Sea, 
and one doesn't know whether to be glad or sorry it wasn't written. 
What is certain is that in inventing an artificial language 
specifically to depict that reality, he has shown the cardinal 
absurdity and equally the impossibility of seeking to put the 
fullest understanding of human life between the covers of a book 
— or in human speech at all, for that matter. That is his major 
triumph, along with the demonstration of just how far one could 
expect to succeed in such an aim. Joyce remains absolutely in 
1 F . P a r v i n Sharpless , ' I r o n y i n J o y c e ' s Portrait: T h e Stasis o f P i t y ' , James Joyce 
Quarterly, i v ( S u m m e r 1967), 320-30 . 
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control of his artist-protagonist; he maintains the most exquisite 
aesthetic 'distance' between them. The 'real' author of Finnegan's 
Wake is Stephen Dedalus, but as he forecast he has refined himself 
out of existence by flying too close to the eternal light in his 
attempt to produce that full picture of reality, the 'photoreflec-
tion' seen by Berkeley's G o d alone. L ike Lucifer, he was 'not 
afraid to make a mistake, even a great mistake, a lifelong mistake, 
and perhaps as long as eternity, too' (Portrait, p. 281). Lucifer 
was banished for eternity, too. O n the technical level, one sees 
here the beginning of an infinite series of 'disappearing' authors. 
Stephen 'wrote' Finnegan's Wake and has disappeared; Joyce in 
creating Stephen has also vanished. The cosmos is returned to 
its pristine impersonality — or so it would seem. Flaubert never 
bargained for 'impersonality' on such a scale. 
A t the end of A Portrait of the Artist we have only a third of 
this story, though it is enough to show that to judge Stephen as a 
prig, pedant and so on is beside the point. It is equally marginal, 
i f not actually wrong, to see him as someone in need of the healing 
influence of a 'reality' which too many seem to interpret as merely 
the everyday kind. Stephen saw clearly the three alternatives 
before him, he made his choice deliberately, and he explored each 
in turn. If we regard Finnegan's Wake as 'his' book he has justified 
his programme to an astonishing degree. He has given us the 
one 'photoreflection' seen by G o d alone. O n such a scale identities 
change, blend, vanish, or reappear even as Einsteinian endeavours 
in the analysis of light in the remotest heavens found infinitely 
receding, impalpable matter. Scientists could not even agree 
about what it was their equations referred to, particles or waves. 
It was a Joycean kind of inspiration which led one scientist to 
suggest, playfully, that perhaps they were dealing with 'wavicles'. 
Scientists carried abstraction to the point where they couldn't 
agree among themselves what it was they were studying. A n d 
there were few left to understand them, anyway. Stephen's 
endeavours culminate in a similar ineluctable crux: language, 
artificially ordered to comprehend and explain the whole reality 
is by definition not understandable by common mortals. It is 
intelligible only to G o d , or to a 'numpa one puraduxed seer in 
seventh degree of wisdom'. A n d besides the seer, one supposes, 
the critics. 
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